Priti Prakash
If I asked how much would you rate India’s Foreign Policy performance for 2025 on a scale of 1-10! Take a good guess and all your time. Let me try.
The year 2025 dawned with New Delhi gazing lovingly into the mirror of its own expectations. After a domestically exhausting year that slipped by, heavy on elections and self-congratulation, Indian foreign policy was meant to return to its natural habitat: airport tarmacs, choreographed hugs and summit photographs captioned as 'historic'. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was expected to clock more air miles, Donald Trump’s second coming was supposed to magically 'reset' India–U.S. ties, and trade deals with half the developed world were confidently promised — again — by the end of the year.
The script looked perfect. China was apparently ready to smile after years of eyeball-to-eyeball hostility at the Line of Actual Control. Russia was happily selling oil at a discount so steep that sanctions felt like a theoretical problem. South Asia, meanwhile, was to be soothed through well-timed visits, carefully worded statements, and the eternal belief that neighbours eventually come around. Five years after Balakot, India projected supreme confidence in its deterrence doctrine, its diplomatic heft, and its ability to manage 'two-and-a-half fronts' — possibly blindfolded.
Then reality arrived, rudely and without protocol.
Instead of a grand India–U.S. reset, 2025 turned into a masterclass in how not to manage a strategic partnership. Washington rediscovered tariffs with enthusiasm, slapping a 25% duty on Indian exports and an extra surcharge for the crime of buying Russian oil cheaply. Labour-intensive sectors bled quietly, workers lost jobs loudly, and India discovered that 'trusted partner' is not legally binding language. Immigration curbs ensured that even the Indian IT worker was reminded of his place in the hierarchy. Trade deals with the U.S. and EU remained 'very close', which is diplomatic shorthand for nowhere near completion.
China and Russia, meanwhile, delivered peak optics with minimal substance. There were smiles, hand-holding, bear hugs and enough photographs to wallpaper South Block — but no credible security guarantees, no investment breakthroughs, and no relief along the LAC. Even the restoration of flights came with the bonus feature of Indian passengers being detained abroad. The much-hyped India–Russia summit concluded triumphantly without any major agreements, proving once again that anticipation is more exciting than outcome.
Globally, confusion became policy. The U.S. National Security Strategy softened its language on China and Russia while soft-pedalling India’s role to a footnote on minerals and the Indo-Pacific. Talk of a U.S.–China 'G-2' floated casually, like a weather update, while India recalculated how “strategic autonomy” feels when the adults change the seating plan.
Closer home, the neighbourhood reminded New Delhi that deterrence brochures do not stop bullets. The Pahalgam terror attack punctured the illusion of total control, and while India’s military response was swift, its diplomatic follow-up was less convincing. Questions about aircraft losses hung in the air, unanswered, doing what silence does best — damage credibility. Ties with Türkiye and Azerbaijan collapsed, Saudi Arabia signed a defence pact with Pakistan, and India was left counting friends with diminishing fingers.
Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar added to the chaos, each offering political uncertainty on sale, while India discovered that influencing transitions is easier in press releases than in practice.
By year’s end, the lesson was unavoidable. Hugs do not equal leverage. Slogans do not replace strategy. Calling oneself Vishwaguru does not automatically earn disciples — and blaming the world for disappointment risks graduating to Vishwa-victimhood. In 2026, India may finally have to choose between theatre and traction. The world, inconveniently, prefers the latter.
Yet, even as the year often seemed defined by friction, missed expectations and strategic discomfort, it would be inaccurate to paint 2025 as an unmitigated foreign-policy failure. Optimisim should not be allowed to fade so easily.
Factually beneath the noise of tariffs, sanctions and regional instability, India quietly consolidated several important gains. New Delhi successfully concluded free trade agreements with the U.K., New Zealand and Oman, expanding market access and reinforcing its credibility as a dependable economic partner.
India sustained its leadership role in the Global South, using multilateral platforms to amplify developing-world concerns on debt relief, food security and climate finance. Strategic autonomy remained intact despite intense pressure to align, while humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations boosted India’s soft power.
Crucially, India kept diplomatic channels open with all major powers, preserving flexibility in an increasingly polarised world.
As 2025 closes, India stands neither diminished nor triumphant, but tested. The year stripped away comforting illusions and forced hard choices. If 2026 is approached with humility, consistency and strategic patience, India can convert disruption into direction — and replace spectacle with substance.
